2 "undertook to draw up a project for the formation of a society to be called 'The American Economic Association', which should be broad enough to appeal to all the younger economists who, irrespective of their personal views, felt the stirring of the new life in economics". His actions helped the AEA to develop into the great institution it is today.
I have the privilege to work for another great institution, the Bank of England. And, as we celebrate the 150th anniversary of Ely's birth, I thought it would be appropriate to choose as the theme of my lecture today the role that institutions play in the conduct of monetary policy. In brief, I want to argue that the core of the monetary policy problem is uncertainty about future social decisions resulting from the impossibility and the undesirability of committing our successors to any given monetary policy strategy. The impossibility stems from the observation that collective decisions cannot be enforced so that it is impossible to commit to future collective decisions; the undesirability reflects the fact that we cannot articulate all possible future states of the world. It is not possible collectively to commit to enforce a monetary policy contract with an institution such as a central bank. And, even if we could, we would not want to because that would prevent us from exploiting new knowledge about the world. In essence, I want to argue that the relevant theoretical framework could be described as "public goods meet incomplete contracts".
Institutional design is at the heart of collective decisions in a world of incomplete contracts, and, interestingly, discussion of monetary issues in recent years has focussed on institutional arrangements. 
I Externalities in the Theory of Money
In the history of money, the two key events are the emergence of a medium of exchange and the rise of institutions governing its management. Those events raise two basic questions which are central to understanding the nature of monetary institutions. First, why did money evolve as a social or public rather than a private institution? Second, how can societies reduce the costs of being unable to make commitments about future collective decisions? The answers to these two questions determine the nature of modern central banks.
The two questions relate to two different externalities. The first is a network externality. Money overcomes the constraint of the double coincidence of wants implied by barter exchange, a view set out in detail by Carl Menger (1892) and which is modelled explicitly in Nobuhiru Kiyotaki and Randall Wright (1989) . More recently, the existence of money has been linked to the information structure of the economy. Agents have imperfect information about their potential trading partner's credit history which explains the emergence of a private sector medium of exchange as an alternative to an extension of credit (Narayana Kocherlakota, 1998 Kydland and Edward Prescott (1977) was that the inability to make commitments leads to a failure to internalise the impact of public policies on the expectations of the private sector.
Dynamic inconsistency was used by Kydland and Prescott (1977) Mechanisms could then be devised to make it less likely that policy would deviate from this optimal plan -perhaps by writing the optimal rule in the form of a constitutional provision which could be overturned only by a substantial majority, or financing deficits by issuing index-linked debt. Such mechanisms would make it incentive compatible collectively to stick to the optimal plan. None of this would have come as a surprise to the authors of the American Constitution. In Federalist
Paper No.10 James Madison points out that "our governments are too unstable"(p173) and in No. 37 he writes: "the people of this country, enlightened as they are with regard to the nature ... of good government, will never be satisfied till 7 some remedy be applied to the vicissitudes and uncertainties which characterise the State administrations"(p243). Outside observers agreed. In 1835 Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that, "the authority which public men possess in America is so brief and they are so soon commingled with the ever changing population of the country that the acts of the community frequently leave fewer traces than events in a private family. .... The instability of administration has penetrated into the habits of the people".
The stability of institutions is, therefore, one of their greatest assets. Barro and Gordon (1983b) assumed the existence of an ongoing government or central bank which had an interest in preserving a reputation for "good" behaviour. A substantial literature, reviewed by Nancy Stokey (2002) , analyses the circumstances in which it is attractive for a "good" government to distinguish itself from a "bad" government.
Stokey shows that if it is not easy to do so, then it may be optimal to impose a monetary policy rule on all governments in order to reduce the damage done by the prospect of a bad government in the future. But how can society convince itself that it can eliminate bad government by adopting a policy rule? A really bad government will simply restore discretion to itself. Good and bad governments are not independent actors. They reflect the degree of consensus on how to construct institutions that will pursue consistent objectives.
The experience of high and variable inflation itself can be an important force shaping public attitudes towards the design of institutions to control it. Differences among cohorts may lead to variations over time in the optimal shape of institutions, rather as
Jefferson advocated. For example, Robert Shiller (1996) reports that 90% of those born before 1940 in Germany agreed with the statement that 'The control of inflation is one of the most important missions of German economic policy', compared with 51% of those born from 1950 onwards. Memories of hyperinflation can be vivid:
Niall Ferguson cites the diary of one Frankfurt resident in 1923: "it was more than disorder that smashed over people, it was something like daily explosions… the smallest, the most private, the most personal events always had one and the same cause; the raging plunge of money"(p154). So it is not surprising that the generation of Germans which created the Bundesbank saw it as a crucial component of their new constitution. Countries, or indeed cohorts, which have not experienced hyper-8 inflation may be more willing to adopt monetary arrangements that are less entrenched in constitutional form than the post-war generation in Germany.
The second aspect of the technology of collective decisions that creates a role for institutions is our ignorance of all possible future states of the world. That means that even if we were able to commit to a policy rule, we would choose not to do so. The exercise of some discretion is desirable in order that we may learn. The most cogent argument against the adoption of a fixed monetary policy rule is that no rule is likely to remain optimal for long. Nor is this just a question of learning about parameter values. That would yield an optimal state-contingent procedure for updating the monetary policy rule. It is that we are unwilling to commit now never to learn from future experience. So we would not want to embed any rule deeply into our decisionmaking structure, such as giving it the force of law or making it part of the constitution. Instead, we delegate the power of decision to an institution that will implement policy period by period exercising "constrained discretion". The status and purpose of such institutions can be embedded into the law or constitution, which may increase the cost of reversing the delegated powers, but the optimal policy path should be open to change in response to learning. Since we cannot hope to describe ex ante what it is we expect to learn, and since new ideas are unlikely to be uniformly recognised and instantly accepted, it may be sensible to delegate both the immediate policy decision and the process of learning to the same institution.
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An interesting example of seeking flexibility to allow for learning occurred during the writing of the US constitution. One draft clause specified that Congress should be allowed to "…emit bills on the credit of the United States". There was a debate on a proposition to strike out the clause. Madison's notes describe George Mason's position on the subject: "Though he had a mortal hatred to paper money, yet, as he could not foresee all emergencies, he was unwilling to tie the hands of the legislature" 8 . Edmund Randolph was of a similar opinion: "… notwithstanding his antipathy to paper money, [he] could not agree to strike out the words, as he could not foresee all the occasions that might arise."
So the ideal is a framework that will implement what we currently believe to be the optimal monetary policy strategy and will deviate from that only if collectively we 9 change our view about what that strategy should be. Our ignorance is too pervasive to allow the adoption of a rule for how learning should occur. So if it is sensible to delegate both policy decisions and the process of learning to institutions such as central banks, that in turn requires those institutions to have political legitimacy and an acceptance that they will not redistribute income and wealth in favour of some groups rather than others at the expense of the objective given to them. 9 Where such institutions are difficult to create, the 'external effect' -as Stokey (2002) called it -of good monetary policy will not be captured. And if the result is a monetary policy that is sufficiently bad, it may result in a radical switch to a unit of account determined externally, an obvious example of which is dollarisation.
Monetary institutions, therefore, play two different roles. First, they expand the possibility frontier of the technology of collective decisions and can be designed to raise the cost of those decisions deviating from pre-announced contingent paths.
Second, they are set up explicitly to exercise a degree of discretion -"constrained discretion" -subject to the broad objective of price stability. Discretion is inevitable because of the need to learn about the economic environment. Institutions thereby become repositories of experience and knowledge which they communicate to society as a whole. shows that, in terms of credibility in financial markets, the design of those policy regimes was less important than the fact of their having broad political support.
III
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Brazil in 1998-99 is a case in point. In 1998 Brazil operated a crawling peg exchange rate regime. As can be seen from Chart 1, throughout that year markets expected the Real to depreciate as evidenced by the fact that the implied forward exchange rate was lower than the spot rate by more than the crawl would imply. 10 In order to defend the crawling peg, the central bank raised interest rates in September 1998 from 20% to 40% a year. The implied forward exchange rate promptly fell. Raising interest rates actually increased the expectation that the peg would be abandoned, since markets knew that high interest rates were likely to prove politically unsustainable. Any government prepared to keep interest rates that high was not likely to win re-election.
In January 1999 a second speculative attack on the peg occurred. And this time the peg was abandoned. Although short-term interest rates were raised while the peg was being defended, they were soon lowered to more sustainable levels. The expectations that had been built into forward exchange rates were proved correct.
[insert chart 1 here]
In the literature on target zones for exchange rates, it is assumed that raising interest rates is a successful method for supporting the exchange rate because of uncovered interest parity. But this ignores the possibility that raising interest rates to defend a fixed exchange-rate regime will simply call into question the durability of the regime itself and raise the probability that the peg or target zone will be abandoned. In such circumstances an increase in interest rates may lead to a fall in the exchange rate.
A second example of the same phenomenon is the pressure on sterling during 1992 and its forced departure from the Exchange Rate Mechanism on 16 September of that year. Massive speculation on that day led to the announcement in the morning of a 2 percentage points rise in interest rates and, when that failed to dampen the pressure on sterling, of a further 3 percentage points rise in rates. That second announcement, far from bolstering the exchange rate, merely convinced financial markets that Britain's membership of the ERM could no longer be sustained politically. The strong political commitment to joining European monetary union, which was the effective support for other currencies in the ERM, was absent in the United Kingdom. Minister Nechirvan Barzani chaired a meeting to discuss the ongoing problem of the weak US dollar in the local currency markets. Discussion focussed on the … unprecedented 45% decrease in the value of the US dollar against the Iraqi Swiss dinar, possible causes of the problem, and effects on the market". Realising that the effect of a change in the exchange rate cannot be understood without an analysis of the causes of the change, the minutes continue, in a manner that would do justice to the minutes of any G7 central bank, "It was pointed out that the US dollar is currently stable in foreign markets so there must be other explanations for the sharp slide in value in Iraqi Kurdistan". 14 In other words, an explanation was needed for a rise in the real value of the Swiss dinar.
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Of course, as we now know, the expectation that a future institution guaranteeing the integrity of the Kurdish area, and of the value of their currency, turned out to be correct. Coalition forces assumed control of the whole territory, and on 7 The 150 parity is barely half the rate the Swiss dinar reached at its peak (see Chart 6).
[insert Chart 6 here]
But it is above the average rate that prevailed over the past six years, and above the rate that would equalise the purchasing power of the two currencies. For example, around the time when the new conversion rate was being determined, it was estimated that 128 Saddam dinars to the Swiss would equalise the wages of an engineer in the two parts of Iraq, 100 would equate the price of the shoes he wore to work, and 133 the price of his suit.
From Chart 6, it is clear that the exchange rate hovered above 150 after the parity was announced on 7 July. There are two reasons for this. First, the 10,000 Saddam dinar note was heavily counterfeited, easy to do given the primitive local technology used to print them. The exchange rate of this note against the dollar is consistently less than the 250 dinar note which, as a smaller denomination note, was less heavily counterfeited. The Swiss notes, printed using more sophisticated technology, are virtually free of counterfeits. The Swiss notes traded at above the parity because of the risk that holders of the 10,000 note would find that they had a forgery and could A well-known policy prescription, which has become known as unconventional monetary policy, is that the central bank should buy long-term Government bonds rather than the more conventional short-term bills. The Bank of Japan did indeed follow this prescription. The logic of such a proposal is as follows. Long-term bonds are likely to contain a significant premium to compensate investors for their lack of liquidity -the fact that, in practice, investors face significant costs when switching between bonds and goods. When the central bank offers to buy illiquid long-term bonds, it increases the average liquidity of the private sector's portfolio, replacing less liquid with more liquid securities. The private sector will therefore be more willing to hold other illiquid instruments, such as private sector bonds and equities. As a result, liquidity premia fall across a broad category of securities, raising their market value.
That will stimulate spending by firms and consumers. 16 Such a policy is preferable to conventional open market purchases of short-term bills or bonds because when interest rates are zero such bills become perfect substitutes for cash. Hence purchases of short bonds have no effect on spending or other real variables.
It is a short step to show that this argument implies an equivalence proposition between unconventional quantitative operations, on the one hand, and a combination of neutral conventional operations and government debt management, on the other.
The purchase of a long-term bond by the central bank is equivalent to a combination of two other operations: a purchase of a short-term bill, followed by an operation that swaps the short-term bill for the long term bond. In either case, the central bank balance sheet ends up with an additional liability in cash, and an additional asset in long-term bonds. The first of these two operations, the purchase of a short-term bill, is neutral in its effect as it replaces one private sector asset, a short-term bill, with another, cash, that is a perfect substitute for it. The second is debt management, which is normally seen as the responsibility of the finance ministry. 16 How large are these effects is an open question. The absence of a compelling general equilibrium theory of liquidity makes it difficult to produce reliable empirical estimates. For the purposes of the equivalence proposition the magnitude of the effect is irrelevant. 17 The legislation was published in 1997, and took effect in April 1998. 18 The supervisor (in English literature) was citing a letter from Mrs Henry Adams to her father, December 1881: "Its not that he bites off more than he can chaw as T.G. Appleton said of Nathan, but he chaws more than he bites off." (Nathan was Appleton's son). The remark is also sometimes attributed to Mark Twain as a comment on Henry James' writing.
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